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I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of the installment land contract, or contract
for deed, as a security device for the sale of real property, contin-
ues undiminished in Montana.1 In a time marked by sharp in-
creases in the cost of institutional credit, the seller-financed con-
1. These contracts have been considered previously in Note, Toward Abolishing In-
stallment Land Sale Contracts, 36 MONT. L. REv. 110 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Abolish-
ing Contracts]; Note, Forfeiture of Payments Under a Land Purchase Contract in Mon-
tana, 19 MONT. L. REv. 50 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Forfeiture in Montana].
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DEFAULT-INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
tract provides the buyer with an affordable alternative to the
standard mortgage.' Compared with other seller-financed arrange-
ments like the purchase money mortgage and trust indenture, the
contract provides the seller with a wider and more expeditious
range of remedies upon the buyer's default.
Chief among these remedies is forfeiture, which allows the
seller to cancel the contract and repossess the property, while re-
taining payments and improvements already made. For the buyer
with little equity in the property, the risk of forfeiture is reasona-
ble. By the terms of the agreement, he may have made only a small
down payment on the purchase price at a favorable interest rate.
Therefore, he stands to lose little if he defaults and the seller
elects forfeiture. But, for that same buyer years later under the
contract, the risk has assumed alarming proportions. At this point,
his investment in the property may have become substantial, and
his obligation may be nearly discharged in full. In this situation, he
stands to lose his entire investment, and the sum of his payments
which the seller may retain will most certainly exceed the damage
that the default has caused. The seller, in fact, may be unjustly
enriched by virtue of the forfeiture.
A default clause in an installment land contract rarely con-
tains a provision that safeguards the buyer's equity as it becomes
substantial. The forfeiture provision operates in the same manner
throughout the life of the contract, even though the interests of the
two parties in the property change markedly. In this way, the stan-
dard default clause is one-sided, operating exclusively for the bene-
fit of the seller while ignoring the ever-increasing interest of the
buyer.
The task of this comment is to examine the default clause and
to restructure its remedies to reflect the true condition of these
interests as they change during the life of the contract. The goal of
this restructuring is to strike a balance of remedial protections, to
rectify the situation as it now stands without unduly sacrificing the
seller's position. The suggested solution, in this regard, is to rele-
gate forfeiture to an effective role as a remedy for default when
that default occurs prior to the buyer's accrual of a reasonably de-
fensible equity.
2. Nationally, the use of these contracts is prevalent among farmers, ranchers and low
income home buyers. Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. REv. 477, 477-
78 (1973). See also Mixon, Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income Transac-
tions, With Proposals for Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in the
Inner City, 7 Hous. L. REV. 523, 523-26 (1970); Note, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for
Breach of Installment Land Sale Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 191, 191-98 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Vendor's Remedies].
19811
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II. THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT-AN OVERVIEW
A. Nature
The installment land contract has been aptly described as "a
hybrid of property concepts on the one hand and contract law on
the other."' 3 The basic aspects of the device are well summarized in
a recent Idaho case:
While the transaction involves the transfer of ownership of real
property, it is governed by the terms of a contract in which ven-
dor and purchaser join. The vendor generally, but not invariably,
deposits a deed in escrow, but title does not pass to the purchaser
until all installments are paid in accordance with the contract.
The contract is frequently called a "poor man's mortgage" be-
cause the vendor, as with a mortgage, finances the purchaser's ac-
quisition of the property by accepting installment payments on
the purchase price over a period of years, but the purchaser does
not receive the benefit of those remedial statutes protecting the
rights of mortgagors . . . .The land secures the purchaser's per-
formance because in the event of his default, the vendor ordina-
rily retains the right to terminate the transaction and retake the
property. The advantage to the purchaser is that he does not have
to procure the expensive (and sometimes unavailable) institution-
al financing; the advantage to the vendor is the theoretically sim-
ple procedure of terminating the purchaser's interest in the event
of default as contrasted with the expensive and time consuming
mortgage foreclosure action, with its right to redemption.4
B. Remedies-A Comparison
Remedies for a buyer's breach of an installment land contract
are not subject to any specific statutory scheme like that provided
for the mortgage or trust indenture. As noted above, the buyer
under an installment land contract lacks the statutory protection
accorded the mortgagor-particularly, a right to a redemption of
his interest." A brief treatment of the remedies allowed under the
mortgage and trust indenture is necessary to understand the na-
ture and extent of the remedies allowed under the installment land
contract.
3. Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 646, 570 P.2d 1334, 1336 (1977) (dictum).
4. Id. (citations omitted).
5. While an equitable conversion is said to occur in both the installment land contract
and the mortgage, the practical distinction between the position of the mortgagee and that
of the purchaser is very different. See generally Lee, The Interests Created by the Install-
ment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 367, 370-77 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Interests].
[Vol. 42
3
Isham: Default—Installment Land Contract
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1981
DEFAULT-INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
1. Mortgage and Trust Indenture
a. Mortgage
Under a mortgage without a power of sale, the mortgagee's
sole remedy for the mortgagor's breach is to sue to foreclose his
equity of redemption.6 The foreclosure proceeding is set by statute,
which empowers the court to decree a sale of the property or a
portion of it, and to apply the proceeds to pay the costs of the
court, the expenses of the sale and the amount due the plaintiff.7 If
a surplus exists from the sale, the court may order it paid to
whomever is entitled to it."
If the proceeds from the sale are insufficient to satisfy the
mortgagor's obligations, a deficiency judgment may be granted
making him personally liable.' A deficiency judgment, however, is
barred in purchase money mortgages. 10
If the mortgage contains a power of sale provision, a non-judi-
cial sale of the property may take place in accordance with the
terms of that provision." Notice of the sale, however, must be
served personally on the mortgagor and other persons claiming in-
terests of record 30 days before the sale date. 2 An action may also
be maintained for a judicial foreclosure.1
Under the mortgage, with or without the power of sale, the
mortgagor is entitled to remedy his breach until foreclosure is judi-
cially decreed, or the non-judicial sale takes place.14 If such a re-
demption occurs, the mortgage continues in effect.15 The mortga-
gor, of course, may bid at the sale as well to recover the property.
After the sale, the mortgagor is guaranteed a statutory right of re-
demption for one year." He may also continue to live on the prop-
erty for that time, if he can show that it was used as a home for
himself or his family.17 The purchaser from the sale is entitled to
the conveyance only upon expiration of the redemption period."8
6. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 71-1-222(1) (1979).
7. MCA § 71-1-222 (1979).
8. MCA § 71-1-225 (1979).
9. MCA § 71-1-222(2) (1979).
10. MCA § 71-1-232 (1979).
11. MCA § 71-1-223 (1979).
12. MCA § 71-1-224 (1979).
13. MCA § 71-1-223 (1979).
14. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 425 (1st ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as REAL ESTATE FINANCE].
15. Id.
16. MCA §§ 71-1-228 and 25-13-802 (1979).
17. MCA § 25-13-821 (1979).
18. MCA § 25-13-810 (1979).
1981]
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b. Trust Indenture
This discussion will focus exclusively on the form of the trust
indenture which is authorized in Montana as a security device for
the sale of land 15 acres or less in size. 19 Under this form, a power
of sale is conferred by statute upon a trustee,20 who may foreclose
the trust indenture once several conditions are met: The trust in-
denture has been recorded, a default has been found to exist and
notice requirements for the sale have been satisfied.21 The buyer,
denominated as "grantor," 22 may cure his default until the date of
the sale and thereby keep the trust indenture in effect.2 Notice of
the sale must be given to him 120 days before it is to take place,2"
which guarantees him ample time to secure refinancing if it is
available. Unlike the mortgage, there is no statutory right of re-
demption after the sale.2 5
The trustee is authorized to use the sale proceeds to pay the
cost of the sale, attorney and trustee fees and the grantor's obliga-
tion.26 If a surplus exists, the trustee may pay it to whomever is
entitled.2 7 Like the purchase money mortgage, no deficiency judg-
ment is allowed under the trust indenture.2
2. Installment Land Contract
The vendor's most commonly exercised remedy for breach of
an installment land contract is to declare a forfeiture.29 That rem-
edy, among others, is set forth in the contract's default clause, and
provides that, upon the purchaser's failure to perform, the vendor
may elect to declare that breach a default and then cancel the con-
tract.3 0 The effect of such a cancellation is to allow the vendor to
abandon his obligation under the contract, to retain all payments
19. MCA § 71-1-304 (1979). See generally Abolishing Contracts, supra note 1, at 116-
18. MCA § 71-1-321 (1979) recognizes the use of trust deeds as valid mortgage forms as well.
20. MCA § 71-1-304(2) (1979). The trustee holds legal title for the purposes of the
trust indenture. MCA § 71-1-303(5) (1979).
21. MCA § 71-1-313 (1979).
22. MCA § 71-1-303(3) (1979). The seller may be named the beneficiary of the trust
indenture. MCA § 71-1-303(1) (1979).
23. MCA § 71-1-312 (1979).
24. MCA § 71-1-315 (1979).
25. MCA § 71-1-318(3) (1979).
26. MCA § 71-1-316(1) (1979).
27. MCA § 71-1-316(3) (1979).
28. MCA § 71-1-317 (1979).
29. The object of this section is to provide an overview of the vendor's remedies for a
purchaser's default under an installment land contract. A more detailed approach to the
major remedies follows in the next section on the default clause.
30. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
[Vol. 42
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and improvements made by the purchaser and to repossess the
property.' Since the deed to the property is usually kept in escrow
for the life of the contract, cancellation also serves to have the
deed returned to the vendor. The buyer is usually allowed a period
in which to cure his default, prior to a declaration of forfeiture,
and thereby keep the contract in effect. If an acceleration provision
is present in the default clause, the seller may demand payment of
the entire balance of the debt, once the buyer has failed to cure the
particular default.2 When the debt is accelerated, the buyer re-
ceives another period of time, often 30 days, in which to refinance
and discharge his entire obligation to the seller. Subsequent to
cancellation, no right to redemption exists, nor is the seller bound
to reimburse the buyer for any portion of his payments that might
exceed the damage sustained by the default.
Without resorting to the remedy of forfeiture, the vendor may
sue on the default. His damages are computed as the full contract
price minus the market value of the land at the date of the default
and any payment received. The vendor may also sue for each in-
stallment as it becomes due although it is seldom done., 4 If an ac-
celeration provision is present in the clause, the vendor may de-
mand the balance owed and sue for that amount."
If the purchaser is in possession of the property and defaults,
the vendor may also bring an action in ejectment"' or unlawful de-
tainer.3 7 If the purchaser is not in possession, the vendor may quiet
title. 8 Again, in either action, the vendor is not obligated, unless
the terms of the clause provide otherwise, to grant the purchaser
either an opportunity to redeem or restitution of payments in ex-
31. See text accompanying notes 47-52 infra.
32. See text accompanying notes 100-12 infra.
33. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1098A (1964) (costs of making a resale may be allowed
as well). There is a split of authority on whether an action at law may result in the vendor
being awarded the purchase price as damages. Generally, specific performance is considered
the proper suit for recovery of the purchase price. Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Install-
ment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAmi L. RFv. 550, 551 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Remedies for
Breach]. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
34. Interests, supra note 5, at 374. That course of action is seldom pursued simply
because of the time and expense involved, and so an acceleration provision is usually em-
ployed to call the balance due. See text accompanying notes 100-12 infra.
35. Id. Also, it should be noted that the two acts of tendering the deed and paying the
final installment are considered concurrent obligations. See Huston v. Vollenweider, 101
Mont. 156, 161-62, 53 P.2d 112, 114 (1935). See also Spencer, Remedies Available Under a
Land Sale Contract, 3 WILLAmErrE L.J. 164, 180-81 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Spencer].
36. Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 651, 570 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1977) (Bistline, J.,
dissenting); Interests, supra note 5, at 374.
37. Kootenai Corp. v. Dayton, - Mont. -, 601 P.2d 47, 49-50 (1979).
38. Interests, supra note 5, at 374.
19811 115
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cess of damage. 39
The vendor may sue for specific performance of the contract,
and the procedure is much like a judicial foreclosure. 40 The court
may provide the purchaser in default with an opportunity to re-
deem his interest and, if he fails to do so within the time provided,
the property may be sold and the proceeds applied to the debt plus
damages and expenses. Unlike the purchase money mortgage and
trust indenture, a deficiency judgment is not barred if the sale pro-
ceeds are insufficient to satisfy the purchaser's obligation. 1
In sum, the vendor's remedies under the installment land con-
tract are far more numerous and varied than those of the mortga-
gee and the beneficiary. There exists a corresponding lack of statu-
tory protection for the purchaser: He is without the right of
redemption and possession to which the mortgagor is entitled; he
lacks the bar against the deficiency judgment available under the
purchase money mortgage and trust indenture; and he is without a
right of restitution of his payments should those payments be
found to exceed the damage sustained by the default.
This lack of protection explains why, under most installment
land contracts, the vendor can afford to offer a low down payment
and a favorable interest rate: to foreclose is far more costly and
time consuming than to declare forfeiture. While power of sale in a
mortgage reduces the cost and delay considerably since the pro-
ceeding is extrajudicial, the power of sale is still subject to the
right of redemption and possession, which may adversely affect the
bids at the sale.' 2 For the most part, the trust indenture compares
favorably with the installment land contract. The major distinction
between the two is that forfeiture may be effected in even less time
than the 120 days set for foreclosure under the trust indenture.
Also, an installment land contract may transfer real property of
any size while the trust indenture is limited to tracts of 15 acres or
less.
III. THE DEFAULT CLAUSE
The relationship of the vendor to the purchaser under an in-
stallment land contract is analogous to that of the mortgagee to
the mortgagor under a purchase money mortgage: under both ar-
39. Id.
40. See text accompanying notes 113-21 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 124-26 infra.
42. The purchaser from the sale will not be entitled to a conveyance, until one year
has elapsed from the date of the sale, as in a court-ordered sale. See MCA § 25-13-810
(1979).
[Vol. 42
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rangements, the seller finances the purchase. But since the install-
ment land contract is not subject to the rigid statutory framework
of the mortgage, the vendor, unlike the mortgagee, is free to exer-
cise his bargaining leverage to script a set of remedies that inhere
exclusively to his benefit. For example, in most default clauses, no
mention is made of the purchaser's remedies for the vendor's
breach; that contingency is left to basic principles of contract law.
More importantly, the standard default clause omits any sort of
protection for the buyer that would operate once his equity be-
comes substantial. This need for protection of the buyer's equity
arises primarily in the context of forfeiture, but the absence of that
protection affects the vendor's exercise of his remedies as well. In
the course of the following sections, the advantages to the vendor
of including a provision protecting the purchaser's equity are de-
veloped, and some suggestions for such a provision are made.
A. Forfeiture
When a buyer defaults on his payments under an installment
land contract, the usual response of the seller is to terminate the
contract pursuant to the forfeiture provision in the default
clause.4" That provision invariably contains words to the effect:
Time is of the essence and, if the buyer fails to perform promptly
and fully, the seller may cancel the contract upon reasonable no-
tice and repossess the property, while retaining payments and im-
provements already made." Thus, if the buyer cooperates by leav-
ing quietly and quickly, the provision provides an expeditious
remedy that allows the seller to dispose of the property to another
buyer without the 120-day delay of the trust indenture, or the
year-long right of redemption and possession of the mortgage. The
fact that many purchasers in default do walk away from the con-
tract contributes to the continued use of forfeiture.4 5 If the pur-
chaser defends against the exercise of forfeiture, the vendor must
resort to the courts and the advantage of expediency is lost.46
43. See Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint,
3 BYU L. REv. 541, 542 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Nelson).
44. Id. See also Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 193 n.7.
45. Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 205-06; Nelson, supra note 43, at 570. "'The
thing to remember, however, is that any device is practical if the other party does nothing
to protect his rights.'" Nelson, The Use of Installment Land Contracts in Mis-
souri-Counting Clouds on Titles, 33 J.Mo.B. 161, 165 (1977), quoted in Nelson, supra note
43, at 570.
46. See also Nelson, supra note 43, at 570.
1981] 117
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1. The American Rule
The effect of the vendor's termination of the contract is ex-
pressed in what has been labeled the "American Rule: '47
[A] vendee in default cannot recover back from his vendor not in
default any money paid on the contract even though as a result of
the breach the vendor has abandoned all idea of further perform-
ance and retains the money not for application on the purchase
price but as forfeited.48
The rule is based on a desire to honor the intent of the parties:4 9
The law will leave the parties to stand where they have volunta-
rily placed themselves. If a buyer defaults, therefore, the law will
not intervene to prevent the consequences of the breach. It has
been said that a buyer cannot both breach his contract and ex-
pect a return of his investment.50
The traditional practice of upholding forfeiture provisions is sim-
ply allowing that which would occur if no express provision were
included in the contract.5 1 Early Montana cases reflect this com-
mon law basis of intent.52
2. Attacks on the Rule
Enforcement of forfeiture provisions has received frequent and
persuasive criticism, particularly when the buyer has nearly per-
formed his obligations and his investment in the property is sub-
stantial.6 3 Authorities such as Williston, Corbin and McCormick
oppose the American Rule." The authors of Restatement of Con-
tracts endorse the minority position, which holds that earnest
money may be forfeited but substantial amounts may not.5 5 Corbin
poses two questions that operate rhetorically to focus much of the
criticism:
47. The term American Rule is employed in Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 12 (1953) to mark the
difference from English and Canadian rules; the term does not have any special significance
in itself.
48. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 12 (1953).
49. Nelson, supra note 43, at 543.
50. Comment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALBANY L.
REV. 71, 76 (1977).
51. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 9, 34 (1953).
52. E.g., Edwards v. Muri, 73 Mont. 339, 350, 237 P. 209, 237 (1925); Forfeiture in
Montana, supra note 1, at 53-54.
53. E.g., Freedman v. Rector of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 632
(1953) (dictum, Traynor, J.).
54. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 791 (3d ed. 1961); 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1129
(1964); C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 153 (1935).
55. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1932).
[Vol. 42
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Is a plaintiff who has partly performed a contract to be penalized
more strongly than one who has not performed at all? Secondly,
is a plaintiff who has almost fully performed his contract to be
penalized more heavily than one who has performed only a small
part of the contract?"
When the forfeiture provision states that payments shall be
retained as liquidated damages for the buyer's default, enforce-
ment of the provision has been criticized as giving effect to a pen-
alty or forfeiture in contravention of public policy: 57
That such contracts do, in fact, provide for a penalty in place of
just compensation cannot be doubted. In most such instances the
breach consists of the mere non-payment of money at the time
specified; and the amount of the forfeiture increases as perform-
ance proceeds, so that the penalty grows larger as the breach
grows smaller.8
3. Measures to Mitigate
a. Legislation
To lessen the impact of forfeiture, some states have enacted
statutes regulating the circumstances in which forfeiture is permit-
ted.59 Iowa, for example, provides a mandatory procedure for ter-
mination of the installment land contract, which includes notice
requirements and a 30-day grace period in which to cure the de-
fault.60 Upon the buyer's failure to cure, the seller may record the
notice and proof of its service, which then establishes constructive
notice of the termination and forfeiture. 1 Minnesota, North Da-
kota and South Dakota have similar statutes with grace periods of
different lengths of time.62 Arizona provides a grace period gradu-
ated in time according to the amount of payment made on the
purchase price.63
Maryland has outlawed forfeiture in contracts for residential
property purchased by noncorporate buyers; those debts must be
56. Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments
Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Corbin].
57. See Freedman v. Rector of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 632
(1953).
58. Corbin, supra note 56, at 1029. See also id. at 1028-31 (forfeiture provision distin-
guished from a bona fide liquidated damages provision).
59. See Nelson, supra note 43, at 544-47.
60. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 656.1 to .6 (West 1950).
61. Id.
62. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to
-06 (1976); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-50-01 to -06 (1967).
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-741 (1974).
1981]
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satisfied instead by mortgage foreclosure methods."' Oklahoma has
gone further and outlawed the device entirely. All installment land
contracts in that state are governed by mortgage law.6
b. Judicial Safeguards
Cognizant of the potential inequity implicit in the American
Rule, and confronted with specific situations in which forfeiture
appears unreasonably harsh, courts have resorted to three methods
to avoid enforcement of the forfeiture provision. The methods are:
Finding an equity of redemption, either outright or by means of
the vendor's prior waiver of delinquency; granting restitution to
the purchaser in default; and providing judicial foreclosure of the
purchaser's equity.6
i. Redemption by waiver
Prior waiver by the vendor of late payments has been found to
excuse an overdue payment upon which the vendor seeks to en-
force forfeiture, 67 and the court may grant the purchaser in default
an opportunity to redeem and complete the contract.68 But, if the
vendor has issued a notice that no further delays shall be tolerated
and that the purchaser is considered in default, the delay usually
will not be excused. 69
ii. Redemption outright
Without relying on waiver, some courts grant the purchaser in
default an equity of redemption unconditionally, while other
courts may grant it only if the purchaser has a substantial invest-
ment in the property.70 California's movement toward uncondi-
tional redemption seen in the cases below is noteworthy, because
64. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -108 (1974).
65. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 11A (West Supp. 1976).
66. See Nelson, supra note 43, at 547-66 (judicial intervention nationally); Vendor's
Remedies, supra note 2, 199-205 (judicial intervention in California).
67. E.g., Yellowstone County v. Wight, 115 Mont. 411, 417, 145 P.2d 516, 518 (1943)
(implied waiver of vendor's right of forfeiture sufficient to grant relief under antiforfeiture
statute). See also Nelson, supra note 43, at 548-49 (discussion of Missouri and Utah courts'
affinity for this form of equity).
68. Suburban Homes Co. v. North, 50 Mont. 108, 117, 145 P. 2, 5 (1914) (dictum).
69. Williams Double Diamond, Inc. v. Royal Village, Inc., - Mont. -, 607 P.2d
1120, 1123 (1980); Huffine v. Lincoln, 87 Mont. 267, 279, 287 P. 629, 631 (1930); Suburban
Homes Co. v. North, 50 Mont. 108, 117, 145 P. 2, 5 (1914).
70. Nelson, supra note 43, at 550. An equity of redemption means "the right of a
debtor who has defaulted on his loan obligations to avoid the adverse consequences of a
default by making payments owing to the lendor." Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 199-
200.
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the statutes that have made that development possible have iden-
tical counterparts in Montana. In Barkis v. Scott,71 the court held
that the default of a buyer, caused by the overdraft on his bank
account in paying the installment, along with his subsequent at-
tempt to tender the amount due, did not constitute a "grossly neg-
ligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty" under California's
"antiforfeiture" statute.7" Therefore, he was given the opportunity
to redeem. In Petersen v. Ridenour,"3 the court moved past a reli-
ance on the antiforfeiture statute in granting redemption to a
buyer in willful default. The statute employed there prohibited
"specific [or] preventive relief . . . to enforce a penalty or forfei-
ture."'74 In MacFadden v. Walker7 5 specific performance was
granted to a buyer who was in willful default for over two years
and had paid more than half the purchase price. The court relied
on four statutes in holding that a forfeiture that bore no reasona-
ble relation to the damage sustained by the breach could not be
enforced.6
iii. Restitution
Utah, Florida and California have adopted the position con-
trary to the American Rule.7 California's development of a canon
of law providing a right of restitution to a purchaser in default
warrants a brief examination, since that development also concerns
the same statutes involved above.
In Baffa v. Johnson,78 a buyer in willful default was denied
restitution, but only because he failed to prove that his payments
exceeded the seller's damage. A year later, the California Supreme
Court decided Freedman v. Rector of St. Mathias,79 which conclu-
71. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
72. California's antiforfeiture statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3275 (West 1970), and MCA §
28-1-104 (1979) are identical; for the text of MCA § 28-1-104 (1979), see text accompanying
note 89 infra.
73. 135 Cal. App. 2d 720, 287 P.2d 848 (1955).
74. The relevent portion of that statute, CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369 (West 1970), and MCA
§ 27-1-401 (1979) are identical.
75. 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971).
76. The four California statutes and their counterparts are: CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294
(West 1970), MCA § 27-1-221 (1979) (limitation on exemplary damages); CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1670, 1671 (West 1970), MCA § 28-2-721 (1979) (prohibiting liquidated damages with excep-
tion); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970), MCA § 27-1-401 (1979) (limiting specific and
preventive relief).
77. See Nelson, supra note 43, at 554-59; Remedies for Breach, supra note 33, at 552-
55 (Florida); Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 201-05 (California).
78. 35 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950).
79. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1953) (Traynor, J., Schaur, J., dissenting in part). See
note 72 supra (California antiforfeiture statute).
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sively established a right of restitution for the purchaser in willful
default independent of the antiforfeiture statute.80 In Freedman,
the plaintiff paid $2,000 down on two lots and agreed to pay the
balance of $16,000 within 30 days. Later he repudiated the con-
tract, claiming there was a cloud on the title, and demanded the
return of the downpayment. The defendant sold the property and
the plaintiff sued for specific performance. While the court af-
firmed judgment denying the plaintiff specific performance or
damages, it reversed on the issue of restitution. The dispositive
fact was that the defendant had sold the property for $2,000 more
than the price originally agreed upon with the plaintiff. The court
held that "[i] f the defendant is allowed to retain the amount of the
down payment in excess of its expenses in connection with the con-
tract it will be enriched and plaintiff will suffer a penalty in excess
of any damages he caused." 81 Because the facts showed that the
plaintiff was in willful default, the court held that the statutory
relief provided by the antiforfeiture statute could not apply. In-
stead, the court found that the four statutes, later employed in
MacFadden, "together with the policy of the law against penalties
and forfeitures provide an alternative basis for relief independent
of [the antiforfeiture statute]." '8 Again, those statutes have identi-
cal counterparts in Montana.8
iv. Judicial foreclosure
Only two states-Indiana and California-have shown a ten-
dency to treat installment land contracts as mortgages without ex-
press statutes to that effect.8 4 Indiana cases reflect this trend
clearly, while only intimations of it exist in California. For exam-
ple, Justice Traynor, writing the opinion in Honey v. Henry's
Franchise Leasing Corp.,85 included a summary of a proposal for a
judicial sale made by amicus curiae. He concluded, however, that
the remedy of a judicial sale was inappropriate there because the
vendor had not requested a rescission of the contract, and neither
80. See Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 202 (cases following Freedman).
81. Freedman, 37 Cal. 2d at -, 230 P.2d at 631.
82. Id. In the opinion, the court considered Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123
Cal. 1, 55 P. 713 (1898), a leading California case which espouses the American Rule, to
show the reason why those statutes could be invoked to avoid the effect of that rule. Id.
Early Montana cases relied on Glock. E.g., Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289,
297, 133 P. 694, 696 (1913).
83. See note 76 supra.
84. Nelson, supra note 43, at 559-62 (discussion of this trend in Indiana and
California).
85. 64 Cal. 2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966).
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party had requested such sale.86 In a case prior to Honey, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment granting strict
foreclosure for a vendor on the basis of California law, but said
also that the lower court could have ordered a judicial sale with an
equity of redemption.87 In reaching that conclusion, the court es-
poused a broad view of the court's power of equity in the context
of the installment land contract:
There is no equitable principle which is more firmly established
in American jurisprudence than the premise that where a vendee
has paid a considerable portion of the purchase price or if the
property has largely enhanced in value by reason of permanent
improvements, or otherwise, or if for any other reason it would be
inequitable to grant a cancellation of the contract, or refuse a de-
faulting vendee reasonable opportunity to cure his defaults, it is
within the inherent power of a court of chancery, independent of
statute, to decree that the property be sold by judicial sale with
the view that the purchase price, expense of litigation and sale
shall first be paid, with the balance over, if any, to the vendee,
thus preserving, so far as is practicable, the respective equities of
the vendor and the vendee.ss
v. Judicial Relief in Montana
Montana Code Annotated [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 28-1-
104 (1979), which is identical to California's antiforfeiture statute,
provides:
Whenever by the terms of an obligation a party thereto incurs a
forfeiture or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture by reason of his
failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved there-
from upon making full compensation to the other party, except in
case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty.
Since 1913 this statute has provided the chief avenue for equitable
relief from forfeiture under an installment land contract. 8 Relief is
discretionary and must be requested. Both redemption and-restitu-
tion have been granted, if the purchaser has been able to prove
three elements:
86. Id. at 803, 415 P.2d at 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
87. Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1957).
88. Id. at 480. See generally Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 204 (discussion of
this case which has yet to be dealt with by California courts).
89. Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 302-04, 133 P. 694, 698-99 (1913)
(apparently the first installment land contract case in which a purchaser was granted relief
under the statute); Sharp v. Holthusen, - Mont. P.2d -, 37 St. Rptr. 1651, 1655
(1980) (most recent application).
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(1) that he stands to incur a forfeiture;
(2) a. (if redemption is requested) that he has tendered full com-
pensation within a reasonable time;
b. (if restitution is requested) that he has paid more than the
reasonable rental for the land;
(3) that he has reasonable grounds for breaching the contract.'
The third element, above, is drawn from Fratt v. Daniels-
Jones,1 in which the statute's express standard of a breach not
"grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent" was construed to mean
that facts must be shown "which appeal to the conscience of a
court of equity.' 2 Facts that have met that test have included:
"[B]reach or apparent breach of the agreement by the vendor; rea-
sonable doubts about the vendor's ability to convey good title; and
misrepresentation by the vendor."'98 Financial inability also ap-
pears to qualify as reasonable grounds for breach, particularly
when redemption is requested." Facts that have failed the test
have included: Failure by the purchaser to bring an action for mis-
representation for over two years; "forgetting' 95 to make payments
for over four months; and default before an alleged breach by the
vendor became known."
MCA § 28-1-104 (1979) illustrates the type of compromise be-
tween the policies at conflict in the area of installment land con-
tracts: freedom to contract and aversion to forfeiture and penalty.
The compromise favors the policy of freedom to con-
tract-specifically, the freedom to agree to remedies available upon
breach-because relief is discretionary with the court, and the bur-
den rests squarely on the applicant to prove the unreasonableness
of the imminent forfeiture.
From the sets of facts that have won relief under the an-
tiforfeiture statute, it may be noted that the "willful" defaulter has
90. Abolishing Contracts, supra note 1, at 114 (footnotes omitted). This article
presents detailed treatment of relief provided by this statute in the installment land con-
tract area; therefore the statue will not be treated in detail here. Id. at 112-15.
91. 47 Mont. 487, 133 P. 700 (1913).
92. Id. at 499, 133 P. at 703 (plaintiff's appeal failed to move the court when he main-
tained he "forgot" to pay the installments for four months). The test has continued to be
used. E.g., Sharp v. Holthusen, - Mont. _, - P.2d -, 37 St. Rptr. 1651, 1654 (1980).
93. Abolishing Contracts, supra note 1, at 114-15 (footnotes and citations omitted).
94. See Sharp v. Holthusen, - Mont. --_ - P.2d -, 37 St. Rptr. 1651, 1654 (1980)
(request for redemption granted when buyer fell behind in payments when forced to repair
well); Parott v. Heller, 171 Mont. 212, 215, 557 P.2d 819, 820 (1976) (request for redemption
granted when crops failed). Both cases reveal applicants made good faith efforts to secure
the necessary funds. Id. See generally Abolishing Contracts, supra note 1, at 115.
95. See note 92 supra.
96. Abolishing Contracts, supra note 1, at 115.
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fared somewhat better in Montana courts than he has under the
same statute in California. This discrepancy, however, may explain
why development of theories independent of the statute has yet to
be undertaken here, while it has with such success in California.
Nevertheless, California-style attacks on forfeiture seem inevitable
in Montana courts.
In sum, blind reliance on the remedy of forfeiture is not prac-
tical. The chief value of the remedy lies in its expediency. If the
purchaser is willing to contest the declaration of forfeiture in court,
that expediency is lost because the vendor will encounter virtually
the same delay that he would experience under an action for judi-
cial foreclosure.97 The purchaser with substantial equity in the
property is certain to resist forfeiture since he has so much to lose.
Moreover, he may very well succeed on the basis of the antiforfei-
ture statute or some novel defense theory, largely because a court
motivated by equitable principles is inclined to regard forfeiture
with disfavor. 98 One commentator has assessed the national situa-
tion as follows:
While forfeitures are still occasionally judicially enforced, it nev-
ertheless can be safely stated that in no jurisdiction today will a
vendor be able to assume that forfeiture provisions will be auto-
matically enforced as written."
B. Acceleration and Specific Performance
An acceleration provision in the default clause empowers the
vendor to demand immediate payment of the balance owed on the
purchase price. 100 It is employed in most default situations either
prior to declaring forfeiture, or prior to suing for specific perform-
ance or for damages.101 When coupled with specific performance,
97. See Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 206-09 (discussion of the disadvantages
involved with enforcing remedies by litigation).
98. Cf. Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc., - Mont. -, 597 P.2d 689, 692-93
(1979) (dictum). "Despite the fact that forfeitures are not favored in law or equity, purchas-
ers advance a most curious request, that being, to impose forfeiture on them. While that
might be advantageous for those particular defendants, we are not unmindful of the harsh
results which forfeiture may work in other circumstances." Id. But see Sharp v. Holthusen,
- Mont. - - P.2d -, 37 St. Rptr. 1651, 1654 (1980). "There comes a time when
failure to perform is not reasonable, and the application of the antiforfeiture statute not
applicable, but this is not the case." Id.
99. Nelson, supra note 43, at 544 (footnotes omitted).
100. See Rader v. Taylor, 134 Mont. 419, 431, 333 P.2d 480, 488 (1958) (An alleged
acceleration provision was unenforceable since it was not "sufficient authority to declare
future installments, not yet due, to be due and payable.").
101. Compare Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 294, 133 P. 694, 695
(1913) (default clause provided for automatic acceleration of the debt upon a breach) with
19811
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the remedy may operate as a judicial foreclosure without the pro-
hibition against a deficiency judgment.10 2
1. Acceleration
The usual course of events in which acceleration may occur is
essentially as follows: When the buyer fails to make an installment
payment, the seller notifies him that he is in default and, unless
the default is cured within 30 days, the seller will accelerate the
debt. If the default remains uncured at the end of that time, the
seller notifies the buyer that the debt is deemed accelerated, and
that the buyer has 30 additional days in which to make payment
on the balance of the purchase price. If the buyer is able to refi-
nance and make the payment within that time, his contract obliga-
tion is discharged. If the debt remains unpaid, the buyer may be
notified that the seller is thereby canceling the contract pursuant
to the forfeiture provision, or that he intends to pursue some other
remedy at law or equity to recover the purchase price.108 .
The advantage of acceleration to the vendor is twofold. First,
it allows him to sue for the entire purchase price following default,
rather than having to wait until after the final installment becomes
due-an impractical course of action if the contract is to run for
any length of time. Without acceleration, the vendor must be con-
tent to sue for whatever payments are presently owed, or sue on
each installment as it becomes due.1" Second, acceleration acts on
the purchaser as a substantial prod to keep his payments current.
The leading case in Montana on acceleration provisions is Ra-
der v. Taylor,105 in which the court held that the alleged accelera-
tion provision in the contract was not, in fact, an acceleration pro-
vision."" As a result, not only was the notice of acceleration held
invalid, but the subsequent notice of forfeiture, which was sent
upon the buyer's failure to pay off the contract, was also held inva-
lid.10 7 In sum, the Rader court held, "[iun the absence of an agree-
ment ... to that effect the maturity of the debt cannot be
Christensen v. Hunt, 147 Mont. 484, 488-89, 414 P.2d 648, 651 (1966) (acceleration is cou-
pled with seller's option to pursue other remedies).
102. In the sense used above, judicial foreclosure means a court-ordered sale of the
property to satisfy the buyer's debts as in a mortgage.
103. See text accompanying notes 167-69 infra (example of how a provision may be
drafted to operate as above).
104. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. An action at law for damages is always
available for breach.
105. 134 Mont. 419, 333 P.2d 480 (1958).
106. Id. at 427, 333 P.2d at 486.
107. Id. at 429, 333 P.2d at 487.
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accelerated."108
In finding the alleged acceleration provision invalid, the Rader
court measured it against three examples of a valid provision:
"then all of said debt secured thereby shall become due and
payable" 1"
"the total balance due under the contract shall become immedi-
ately due and payable"110
"then the whole of said payments and interest shall, at the elec-
tion of said first party become immediately due and payable."''
The alleged acceleration provision in Rader was intermingled with
the forfeiture provision:
And in case of the failure of Buyers to make either of the
payments... then the whole of said payments and interest shall,
at the election of Sellers[,] be forfeited and determined by giving
to Buyers ninety days (90) notice in writing ....
Thus, if an acceleration provision is to be effective, it must be
drafted substantially the same as the above examples, so it can be
recognized as distinct from any other remedy in the default clause.
Maintaining the distinctness of acceleration works to the advan-
tage of the vendor in another way. In order to keep his options
open upon default, the vendor should not wed acceleration to any
one remedy. He may wish to accelerate the debt, examine the cir-
cumstances of the default, and then elect his remedy, whether it be
forfeiture, a suit for damages or a suit for specific performance.
2. Specific Performance
Because the law considers each parcel of real property unique,
the remedy of specific performance is available to either party
upon a breach of an installment land contract." 8 In Glacier Camp-
ground v. Wild Rivers, Inc.,114 the Montana Supreme Court
adopted a new wrinkle to that remedy as it operates for the benefit
of a vendor upon a purchaser's default.
Essentially, the court in Glacier recognized that a request for
a money judgment for the balance of the purchase price, which
108. Id. at 427, 333 P.2d at 486.
109. Id. at 431, 333 P.2d at 488 (citing Bohan v. Harris, 71 Mont. 495, 497, 230 P. 586,
587 (1924)).
110. Id. (citing Silvast v. Asplund, 93 Mont. 584, 594, 20 P.2d 631, 636 (1933)).
111. Id. (citing White v. Jewitt, 106 Mont. 416, 418, 78 P.2d 85, 86 (1938)).
112. Id. at 425, 333 P.2d at 485.
113. Spencer, supra note 35, at 172; Remedies for Breach, supra note 33, at 555.
114. - Mont. -, 597 P.2d 689 (1979).
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may be awarded in an action at law,115 is identical to a decree for
specific performance in which the purchaser is required to pay the
balance of the purchase price. 116 In this regard, the court adopted
the holding in Renard v. Allen,117 an Oregon case in which a prayer
for a sale of the property was found consistent with the remedy of
specific performance. s Thus, if the vendor pleads and proves his
ability and willingness to perform,119 a decree may be awarded re-
quiring the purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase price, or
requiring a sale of the property if the balance is not paid within
the time set by the court.1 0 The proceeds from the sale would be
applied to the sum owed, plus damages and sale expenses.1 21
Neither Glacier nor Renard specifically addresses the question
of whether the debt must first be accelerated in order for the ven-
dor to request a decree of specific performance that involves a judi-
cial sale. 2 The question may seldom arise since acceleration, be-
cause of its utility, is usually included in the default clause, and
the vendor usually elects to exercise it when a default goes un-
cured. To be safe, the vendor ought to exercise the power to accel-
erate if he wishes to request a decree that specifically mandates
the sale of the property. But, if the power to accelerate is present
in the clause and unexercised, it may be argued that a court of
equity has the inherent power to grant such a decree in order to
effect the intent of the parties.12 8
In Renard the Oregon court also held that the statute prohib-
iting deficiency judgments in purchase money mortgages did not
apply to installment land contracts.1 24 Therefore, if the proceeds of
the sale were found insufficient to satisfy the buyer's obligations,
judgment could be granted making him personally liable for the
balance owing. 12 Noting that the Oregon statute is identical to the
Montana statute barring deficiency judgments in purchase money
115. See note 33 supra.
116. Glacier, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d at 699.
117. 237 Or. 406, 391 P.2d 777 (1964).
118. Glacier, __ Mont. -, 597 P.2d at 698.
119. Id. at -, 597 P.2d at 699.
120. See id. at -, 597 P.2d at 697.
121. Id.
122. In Glacier, an acceleration provision was found to be present in the default
clause, id. at -, 597 P.2d at 694, and was found to be exercised, id. at -, 597 P.2d at 695.
In Renard, 237 Or. at 408, 391 P.2d at 778, an acceleration provision was found to be pre-
sent but the opinion does not indicate that it was exercised.
123. See Remedies for Breach, supra note 33, at 555-56.
124. Renard, 237 Or. at 412, 391 P.2d at 780.
125. Id.
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mortgages, the Glacier court adopted that holding as well. 126
One commentator, writing on Renard, has said, "The recent
decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in Renard v. Allen may
cause a suit for specific performance to become the most com-
monly sought vendor's remedy.1' 27 This comment may be equally
applicable to Glacier. In effect, specific performance of this sort
brings about a judicial foreclosure without the statutory prohibi-
tion against the deficiency judgment. In this way, the remedy is
clearly superior to an action for forfeiture in most instances. From
a vendor's standpoint, specific performance ensures that he will re-
ceive the benefit for which he originally contracted. An action for
forfeiture, in contrast, may entail the same amount of time spent
in litigation and, if successful, results in the vendor having to resell
the property. As discussed earlier, an action for forfeiture may also
be subject to equitable relief that mitigates its enforcement. Fi-
nally, from a standpoint of fairness, specific performance precludes
the vendor from becoming unjustly enriched when the payments to
be retained exceed the damages of the default. If a sale of the
property results in a surplus of proceeds, the purchaser should ex-
pect to share in that surplus.13 8
C. A Remedy for Defensible Equity
The claim that forfeiture is an effective remedy for all de-
faults, no matter when they occur during the life of the contract,
has been seen to be without merit. For the most part, forfeiture is
a paper tiger. It is fearsomely effective if the buyer lacks the
knowledge that it may be resisted, the financial means to contest it
or the equity that justifies defense. The value of forfeiture to the
seller exists in its use as a self-help remedy by which the time,
expense and risk of litigation are avoided. 29 Moreover, it has been
seen that specific performance appears to be the more reliable ac-
tion if the seller must resort to litigation.
126. Glacier, - Mont. _ 597 P.2d at 697.
127. Spencer, supra note 35, at 182.
128. This conclusion would seem to follow from the logic of both Renard and Glacier
in permitting the purchaser to be held personally liable if the proceeds fail to satisfy the
claim. Hence, if there exists a surplus of proceeds, the purchaser should share in that as
well.
One question arises that the courts did not address: Whether the purchaser from the
court-ordered sale would acquire the land subject to statutory rights of redemption? MCA §
25-13-802 (1979) provides for a year-long right of redemption from the sale of property in
execution of judgment. It is not clear whether this sort of decree of specific performance
would entail those rights.
129. See Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 205-06.
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With the inherent flexibility of the installment land contract,
the seller should not be left with only a choice between self-help
and litigation in order to deal with default. By including a power of
sale in the default clause, the seller may foreclose the buyer's in-
terest without litigation, and he may increase the effectiveness of
forfeiture as a self-help remedy. The following sections explore a
restructuring of the vendor's remedies in order to include a power
of sale.
1. Defensible Equity
At some point during the operation of an installment land
contract, the buyer's investment in the property reaches an
amount worth defending from forfeiture, even though he has given
that power to the seller by the terms of the contract. In other
words, once the buyer's investment becomes substantial, the seller
should expect that the buyer in default may breach his agreement
to comply with forfeiture. That expectation seems justified be-
cause, despite the changing interests of the parties in the property,
forfeiture normally operates in the same manner throughout the
life of the contract. 180 Thus, as the buyer's investment increases,
the risk that forfeiture will fail as a self-help remedy increases.
Furthermore, as that investment increases, the risk increases that
a court of equity will refuse to enforce the forfeiture provision as it
is written.131
For the purpose of illustration, the term "defensible equity"
may be used to characterize the amount of investment, including
appreciation of the land, that the buyer most likely will not allow
to be forfeited without resisting. Determination of that amount
may depend upon the particular terms of payment, the property
involved and even the personality of the buyer. Hence, a precise
determination of a defensible equity would be difficult to make
but, as discussed below, the process of bargaining should be able to
settle that determination to the satisfaction of the parties. The
benefit of the notion of defensible equity is that it can indicate
when forfeiture may become unreasonable, and therefore, progres-
sively ineffective to deal with the buyer's default.
130. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
131. There has been no attempt made to correlate levels of purchasers' equity with
successful requests for relief under Montana's antiforfeiture statute simply because there
are too few cases. As discussed earlier, relief is a matter of several considerations, see text
accompanying note 90 supra, but it seems safe to say that substantial equity can indicate a
history of prompt and full performance which a court of equity may take into consideration.
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2. Limitation of Forfeiture
With the notion of defensible equity in mind, the vendor
should be amenable to negotiating a limitation on forfeiture with
the purchaser, and the two parties should be able to strike a bal-
ance between their respective risks in regard to forfeiture. From
the vendor's standpoint, he should be willing to limit his right to
use forfeiture in order to ensure its efficacy as a self-help remedy.
The purchaser should be more than willing to bind himself to com-
pliance with the vendor's exercise of a limited forfeiture power,
since he is assured of not having to face the prospect of a substan-
tial equity being subject to forfeiture.
In a practical sense, a determination of defensible equity can
be achieved by bargaining over the use of forfeiture. The bargain-
ing may concern the amount of the total contract price that must
be paid before forfeiture becomes unavailable to the vendor. Total
contract price means the purchase price, including down payment,
as well as interest. 182 Once that amount is agreed upon, it can be
translated into the length of time forfeiture would be available to
the vendor, or the percentage of the contract price that must be
paid to extinguish the right of forfeiture. While bargaining may
not result in a precise determination of defensible equity, it should
result in a reasonable approximation that is satisfactory to the par-
ties. Evidence of such a negotiation would appear to be dispositive
if the agreement were challenged in court.188
3. Power of Sale
Limitation of forfeiture serves to make forfeiture a more rea-
sonable and effective remedy, but it does not solve the vendor's
problem of being able to foreclose the purchaser's equity without
litigation. By negotiating a limit on forfeiture, however, the vendor
should be entitled to a power of sale that would be used primarily
once his right to forfeiture was extinguished. This section will ex-
amine the operation of a power of sale and the legal propriety of
132. This suggested method would seem to make sense for the average buyer of a
small piece of real property for which the contract may operate for 20 years. If the percent-
age to be discharged were to be computed on principal only, the limitation of forfeiture
would not have any effect until very late in the term, and it would not reflect the buyer's
true equity in the property because it would ignore appreciation.
133. Bargaining in most situations would not be complex or extended. It would pro-
ceed chiefly on a determination of what seemed reasonable to both parties in regard to the
particular contract. For example, the vendor might offer a limitation at 25% of the contract
price, and then agree to lower it to 20%. As long as the parties deal at arms length, it seems
likely that a court would honor that agreement, should it have to be enforced in court.
19811
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employing it in an installment land contract.
A power of sale is a contractual agreement in which the buyer
agrees to allow the seller, upon the buyer's default, to repossess the
property, hold a public sale and use the proceeds to satisfy the
buyer's obligation.'8 In Montana, the power of sale is used prima-
rily in mortgages and trust indentures to avoid the time and ex-
pense of judicial foreclosure. 8 5 Traditionally, the power of sale has
not been used in installment land contracts because of the vendor's
confidence in forfeiture.'36 Since this confidence seems misplaced,
particularly when substantial equity is at stake, a power of sale
appears to be an appropriate substitute for forfeiture of defensible
equity.
Because a power of sale is authorized by statute for use in
mortgages and trust indentures, the question must be posed
whether that statutory authorization precludes the use of a power
of sale in an installment land contract. In response, it seems clear
that the use of a power of sale provision in a contract default
clause does not require statutory authorization since it is the prod-
uct of private bargaining between the parties to the contract. 31 In
this sense, a power of sale is a contractual right like forfeiture and
acceleration. If public policy permits the use of forfeiture, it clearly
should permit the use of a power of sale provision if the provision
appears fair and reasonable.
A brief examination of the statutes pertaining to the power of
sale as it is used in the mortgage and trust indenture reveals no
legislative purpose to restrict its use to those devices. MCA § 71-1-
111 (1979) provides for the use of a power of sale in a mortgage,'"
while MCA § 71-1-223 (1979) provides the choice, under a mort-
gage with a power of sale, either to foreclose the mortgagor's equity
judicially or by the provisions of the mortgage. 39 If foreclosure is
134. Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 209.
135. See generally text accompanying notes 11-28 supra; REAL ESTATE FINANcE supra
note 14, at 476-77.
136. In California, forfeiture was relied on until the late 1940's, when judicially im-
posed protections for defaulting purchasers appeared. Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at
212 n.120.
137. Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 212 (where an argument is made for the
legal propriety of power of sale provisions in California installment land contracts).
138. MCA § 71-1-111 (1979) provides: "A power of sale may be conferred by a mort-
gage upon the mortgagee or any other person, to be exercised after a breach of the obliga-
tion for which the mortgage is a security."
139. MCA § 71-1-223 (1979) provides:
When a real estate mortgage confers a power of sale, either upon the mortgagee or
any other person, to be executed after a breach of the obligation for which the
mortgage is a security, either an action may be maintained under this part to
foreclose or proceedings may be had under the provisions of the mortgage.
132 [Vol. 42
23
Isham: Default—Installment Land Contract
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1981
DEFAULT-INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
to be effected by the provisions of the mortgage, certain require-
ments for notice, as provided by MCA § 71-1-224 (1979), must be
met.140 The Small Tract Financing Act of Montana, as discussed
earlier, 141 authorizes and regulates the use of a power of sale as it
exists in a trust indenture.1,2 While the statement of policy of the
act limits the use of trust indentures to tracts no larger than 15
acres, "43 there appears to be no intent to make the power of sale
the exclusive tool of the trust indenture. 4
4
If an installment land contract employed a power of sale as
the sole remedy for the purchaser's default, it might be argued that
the contract was in substance a trust indenture, and at least voida-
ble for failing to comply with the statutory requirements of that
device. The installment land contract, however, has been held not
to be a mortgage, 4 and therefore, there seems to be no reason to
challenge the validity of an installment land contract that contains
a power of sale as one of the possible remedies for the purchaser's
default.
The power of sale fits neatly into the installment land con-
tract. Because the vendor retains the legal title to the property for
the life of the contract, a provision that would grant the vendor the
power to dispose of the purchaser's equity would be sufficient.
That provision would be placed in the body of the contract, and
would state to the effect that, upon the purchaser's unremedied
default, the vendor was authorized to declare a sale and to apply
the proceeds to the debt owed plus expenses. s46
Since the power of sale would be employed chiefly in place of
forfeiture, the vendor would gain little by drafting a provision that
140. Thirty days notice is required with advertising by newspaper and posting, and
personal service must be had on persons claiming interests of record. MCA § 71-1-224
(1979).
141. See generally text accompanying notes 19-28 supra.
142. MCA § 71-1-305 (1979) provides that trust indentures are subject to all mortgage
laws except as those laws are inconsistent with the Small Tract Financing Act of Montana.
143. MCA § 71-1-302 (1979) provides in part, "it is hereby declared to be the public
policy of the state of Montana to permit the use of trust indentures for estates in real prop-
erty of not more than 15 acres as hereinafter provided."
144. The particular nature of the trust indenture, as it operates in the Small Tract
Financing Act, is that it involves a power of sale in a trustee who is precluded from being
the beneficiary as well. MCA § 71-1-303(1) (1979). In contrast, under a standard mortgage
with a power of sale, the mortgagee, who would benefit from the sale, may have the power of
sale vested in him. MCA § 71-1-111 (1979). Thus, the power of sale as it operates in the
Small Tract Financing Act is a variation of the power of sale as it exists generally.
145. E.g., Glacier, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d at 698; Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47
Mont. 289, 297-98, 133 P. 694, 696-97 (1913).
146. No attempt will be made here to discuss how that provision would specifically
appear.
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was simply a pretense for forfeiture. Hence, once forfeiture was ex-
tinguished in the contract, the purchaser would deserve an ex-
tended period of redemption, which would reflect his increased eq-
uity and his satisfactory performance up to that point. While the
mortgage power of sale requires 30-days notice prior to sale1 7
which coincides with the purchaser's equity of redemption, the
trust indenture requires 120 days."'4 The difference in time pre-
sumably exists because the trust indenture does not provide a
year-long statutory right of redemption for the purchaser after the
sale."149 The California statute which regulates the power of sale
provides for a period of 111 days, from default to sale, in which the
purchaser may redeem his interest.1 50 Since the purchaser under
the installment land contract would have no opportunity to re-
deem after the sale, his increased equity, once forfeiture has been
extinguished, warrants a period for redemption comparable with
the 120 days provided by the trust indenture.15 1 That period might
include 30 days in which the purchaser could redeem the specific
default, and 60-90 days in which to discharge the accelerated debt.
The use of affidavits to establish that the vendor has complied
with the terms of the power of sale provision, in regard to notice
and advertisement, would guard against a challenge on grounds of
technical breach.152
In sum, the use of a limited forfeiture provision coupled with a
power of sale enhances the remedies of the seller, and provides a
measure of increased protection for the buyer's interests. During
the initial period of the contract term in which the risk of default
is high, 58 the vendor would have the right to exercise forfeiture as
well as to effect a sale. Through bargaining, the parties should be
able to determine a period in which forfeiture operates reasonably
and effectively. Subsequent to that period, the purchaser would be
guaranteed that forfeiture was unavailable to the vendor. The pur-
chaser would also be guaranteed an increase in time in which to
redeem his interest, while the vendor would rely on a summary
147. MCA § 71-1-224 (1979).
148. MCA § 71-1-315(1)(a) (1979).
149. See MCA § 71-1-318(3) (1979) (the trustee's deed will convey title without a right
of redemption).
150. Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 211. See generally id. at 210-11 (discussion
of the mechanics of the California power of sale statute, CAL. CIV. Cone § 2924 (West 1970)).
151. As a private contractual agreement, the power of sale would not be required to
provide for any right of redemption after the sale.
152. The affidavits could also be deposited with the deed for recording.
153. See generally Vendor's Remedies, supra note 2, at 215 n.144 (survey of California
real estate developers revealed that, in their experience, 90% of purchasers who default do
so within the first year of the contract).
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proceeding by which to foreclose that interest. The vendor would
also have other remedies at law or equity with which to protect his
interest.
D. Election of Remedies
Upon a purchaser's default, the vendor has a great deal of flex-
ibility with which to respond to that default, if he has not bound
himself to a specific course of action by the terms of the default
clause. The fundamental choice that he faces after default is
whether to disaffirm the contract through use of the remedy of for-
feiture, or to affirm the contract by the use of some other remedy
like specific performance.1' This section briefly explores the law of
election of remedies as it relates to installment land contracts.
1. Election Prior to Default
In the absence of a contractual provision expressly limiting the
remedies available, a party may pursue any remedy available at
law or equity.1" As applied specifically to forfeiture, this rule pro-
vides that, unless the forfeiture provision expressly states that it is
to be the only course of settlement upon default, the provision ex-
ists for the benefit of the vendor alone, and he may elect to resort
to it or to sue on the contract.""
As discussed earlier, acceleration may be used prior to forfei-
ture or prior to any other remedy. 57 An election to accelerate the
debt by itself has not been held to waive the remedy of
forfeiture.158
2. Election upon Default
If a vendor pursues one of his remedies to a conclusion, he is
precluded from attempting to pursue another.1" Hence, it has
been held that the vendor is not permitted to sue for installments
154. The doctrine of election of remedies governs the pursuit of inconsistent remedies;
in regard to the installment land contract, inconsistency centers primarily on the use of
forfeiture by which the contract is disaffirmed and the pursuit of some other remedy by
which the contract is affirmed. 5 S. WnjroN, CoNrAcTs § 683 (3d ed. 1961).
155. Glacier, - Mont. _ 597 P.2d at 696.
156. Alexander v. Wingett, 63 Mont. 254, 259, 206 P. 1088, 1089 (1922) (reaffirmed in
Glacier, - Mont. _ 597 P.2d at 696).
157. See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
158. Although it might be argued that acceleration of the debt was inconsistent with
forfeiture, traditionally the two have been used together in Montana. E.g., Cook-Reynolds
Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 294, 133 P. 694, 695 (1913); Glacier, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d
at 694.
159. J. M. Hamilton Co. v. Battson, 99 Mont. 583, 591, 44 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1935).
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owing, once the purchaser in default has vacated the premises
upon receipt of a notice of forfeiture.16 0 It has also been held that a
vendor's demand for payment of an installment, coming after the
commencement of an action to cancel the contract, is not a waiver
of that action since no remedy had been pursued to its
conclusion.161
IV. A PROPOSED DEFAULT CLAUSE
To illustrate the suggestions made in the course of this discus-
sion, a proposed default clause is included with a provision-by-pro-
vision analysis. For the sake of brevity, a provision detailing the
manner in which the seller is to notify the buyer has been omitted.
A. The Clause
Time is of the essence. If the buyer fails to make full and
prompt payment of the principal or the interest thereon, or fails
to make the required payments for taxes, insurance and assess-
ments before they become delinquent, or fails to perform any of
the covenants or conditions on his part, the seller, at his option,
may consider such a failure a "default" by providing written no-
tice of such default to the buyer. The buyer shall have 30 days
from the mailing of this default notice, or 30 days from the date
of personal service on the buyer (or upon an officer, director or
authorized agent of buyer) in which to cure the default. As used
herein, "cure" means to make full payment of all payments due,
or to perform all covenants or conditions to be performed by the
date specified in the default notice. If so cured, this contract shall
continue in full force and effect.
In the event that the buyer fails or neglects to cure the no-
ticed default within the 30-day period, then the seller, at his op-
tion, may provide the buyer with a second written notice by
which the total amount owing and unpaid on the principal, to-
gether with the seller's reasonable attorney fees incurred by the
preparation of the default notices, is accelerated and therefore
shall become immediately due and payable. The buyer shall have
160. Adamczik v. McCauley, 89 Mont. 27, 35, 297 P. 486, 488 (1931) (when purchaser
vacated the premises upon receipt of a notice of forfeiture vendor was deemed to have pur-
sued remedy of forfeiture to a conclusion). But see Glacier, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d at 700
(Sheehy, J., dissenting). Justice Sheehy maintained that the default clause was written in
such a way as to mandate forfeiture once the demand for acceleration was not satisfied. In
effect, he said forfeiture was elected by the terms of the clause and occurred ipso facto upon
exercise of the power to accelerate and the failure to comply with that demand. Id. Support
for that proposition is found in early cases. E.g., Edwards v. Muri, 73 Mont. 339, 351, 237 P.
209, 213 (1925); Light v. Zeiter, 124 Mont. 67, 71, 219 P.2d 295, 297 (1950).
161. White v. Jewitt, 106 Mont. 416, 421, 78 P.2d 85, 88 (1935).
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30 days, from the mailing of the second notice or upon being per-
sonally served with the notice, in which to pay the entire sum due
under the contract. If so paid, the buyer's contract obligations
shall be deemed discharged.
In the event that the buyer fails or neglects to pay the entire
sum due within the time specified in the second default notice,
then the seller, at his option, may provide the buyer with written
notice that the seller thereby intends to:
1. Cancel and terminate this contract, upon which the
buyer shall quit the premises peaceably, and the seller shall
repossess the property and retain all payments made on ac-
count of the contract and all improvements made to the
property as reasonable value for the use and enjoyment of
the premises during the period in which they were occupied
by the buyer; or
2. Exercise the power of sale as provided in this contract
for the purpose of foreclosing the buyer's interest in the
property; or
3. Pursue any and all remedies at law or equity to enforce
performance of this contract, or to collect the balance due
hereunder. Reasonable attorney fees incurred by such action
shall be included.
In the event that the buyer has paid 20% of the contract
price, which includes principal plus interest, the seller's right to
cancel the contract upon the buyer's default shall be extin-
guished, and the buyer shall have an additional 30 days in which
to pay the entire sum due, if the balance is accelerated as pro-
vided hereinabove.
B. Analysis
Time is of the essence. If the buyer fails to make full and
prompt payment of the principal or the interest thereon, or fails
to make the required payments for taxes, insurance and assess-
ments before they become delinquent, or fails to perform any of
the covenants or conditions on his part, the seller, at his option,
may consider such a failure a "default" by providing written no-
tice of such default to the buyer.
Time: The phrase, "time is of the essence," may be included in
the default clause or elsewhere in the contract. It is included pri-
marily to make the purchaser's performance on the date agreed
upon an expressly enforceable term of the agreement, and it is said
that a court of equity requires an express statement that timely
performance is a duty in order not to interfere with or modify that
19811
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duty.162
Default: In the installment land contract, default is synony-
mous with material breach. Therefore, to avoid questions of
whether a breach is material or immaterial, all breaches may be
defined as a default.1"
Notice: Notice provisions must be strictly followed in a default
clause in order to guard against the defense that timeliness has
been waived. 1 4 If the amount of a default is to be set forth in a
notice, the figure must be accurate in order for the notice to have
the desired effect.6a
The buyer shall have 30 days from the mailing of this default
notice, or 30 days from the date of personal service on the buyer
(or upon an officer, director or authorized agent of the buyer) in
which to cure the default. As used herein, "cure" means to make
full payment of all payments due, or to perform all covenants or
conditions to be performed by the date specified in the default
notice. If so cured, this contract shall continue in full force and
effect.
Grace Period: The period in which the buyer is allowed to
remedy his default varies from contract to contract, and is deter-
mined by a standard of reasonableness."' 6
Notice: The manner in which the buyer may be notified may
162. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.45 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). Case law under the
antiforfeiture statute reveals clearly that the phrase has little effect within that particular
context of equity. See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra. See also Barkis v. Scott, 34
Cal. 2d 116, 122-23, 208 P.2d 367, 371-72 (1949) (Justice Traynor construed California's
antiforfeiture statute to allow relief even though time had been declared of the essence). But
see Ingalls v. Brady, - Mont. -, 591 P.2d 200, 204 (1979) (vendor denied rescission of
sale/purchase agreement for real property because time was not made of the essence in the
agreement).
163. E.g., Dobitz v. Oakland, - Mont. -, 561 P.2d 441, 442-43 (1977) (by the terms
of the clause, a breach of the provision prohibiting assignment was a default as well as
enforceable as such); Smith v. Zepp, 173 Mont. 358, 368, 567 P.2d 923, 929 (1970) (by the
terms of the clause, a breach of production quota in an installment land contract for a
mining claim was not held to be a default, therefore a declaration of forfeiture was denied).
164. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
165. E.g., Shuey v. Hamilton, 142 Mont. 83, 91, 381 P.2d 482, 486 (1963) (notice of
default contained "unreasonable" error in the amount owed, and was held unenforceable).
See also Bennett v. Goltz, 149 Mont. 445, 448, 428 P.2d 1, 3 (1967) (contested notice of
acceleration, with forfeiture occurring automatically if accelerated debt not satisfied, held
enforceable despite allegations of ambiguity); Christensen v. Hunt, 147 Mont. 484, 489-90,
414 P.2d 648, 651 (1966) (technical breach by which notice of forfeiture was sent to address
different from that provided in contract was held not prejudicial to vendor since purchasers
received it at the address to which it was sent).
166. Some contracts include a provision for shortening the grace period upon repeated
defaults. Use of such a provision may be open to attack for working an unjust forfeiture, but
the circumstances of the default will control. See generally text accompanying notes 60-63
supra.
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be drafted in more detail, and relegated to a separate clause. The
portion above in parentheses applies to a corporation or other bus-
iness entity.
Cure: Care should be taken to define special terms. Here, cure
is used as a synonym for remedy, and is defined to clarify what the
buyer in default must do in order to keep the contract in effect.
In the event that the buyer fails or neglects to cure the no-
ticed default within the 30-day period, then the seller, at his op-
tion, may provide the buyer with a second written notice by
which the total amount owing and unpaid on the principal, to-
gether with the seller's reasonable attorney fees incurred by the
preparation of the default notices, is accelerated and therefore
shall become immediately due and payable. The buyer shall have
30 days, from the mailing of the second notice or upon being per-
sonally served with the notice, in which to pay the entire sum due
under the contract. If so paid, the buyer's contract obligations
shall be deemed discharged.
Acceleration: The provision above provides for the accelera-
tion of the balance of the purchase price. An acceleration provi-
sion must be present in the default clause in order for the balance
to be called due immediately once the default has gone uncured;
the debt cannot be accelerated by notice alone. 6' The acceleration
provision may be tied to the forfeiture provision, or it may be used
as a prelude to the exercise of any remedy. Unless acceleration is
kept clearly distinct from any other remedy, it may be construed
that, once acceleration is effected and has gone unsatisfied, the
seller has bound himself to the remedy that follows it in the
clause. 6' Acceleration coupled with the remedy of specific per-
formance may result in a judicial foreclosure without the prohibi-
tion against a deficiency judgment.169
Grace Period: Thirty days are provided the buyer to satisfy
the acceleration demand. Again, the number of days provided is
measured by a standard of reasonableness. Enough time should be
given to the buyer to refinance, without inconveniencing the seller
who most likely has obligations to satisfy with the buyer's
payment.
167. See generally text accompanying notes 100-12 supra.
168. See generally Glacier, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d 689. At issue was the construction
of a default clause in which acceleration was ambiguously linked with forfeiture. The major-
ity held that the clause did not provide that any remedy, particularly forfeiture, was the
exclusive remedy for default, and that the seller's actions subsequent to default evidenced
an intent to sue on the contract. Id. at _, 597 P.2d at 695. But see Justice Sheehy's dis-
sent. Id. at -, 597 P.2d at 700.
169. See generally text accompanying notes 113-28 supra.
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In the event that the buyer fails or neglects to pay the entire
sum due within the time specified in the second default notice,
then the seller, at his option, may provide the buyer with written
notice that the seller thereby intends to: . . .
Option: Throughout the clause the seller is given the option of
whether to exercise his remedial rights in order to retain adequate
flexibility to deal with a default. This flexibility is most important
in the exercise of major remedies like forfeiture or specific
performance. 170
Notice: By having the seller give notice of what he intends to
do to protect his interests, the buyer is assured of reasonable no-
tice. This consideration applies particularly to the exercise of
forfeiture.17 1
1. Cancel and terminate this contract, upon which the buyer
shall quit the premises peaceably, and the seller shall repossess
the property and retain all payments made on account of the con-
tract and all improvements made to the property as reasonable
value for the use and enjoyment of the premises, during the pe-
riod in which they were occupied by the buyer; or...
Forfeiture: This is a standard forfeiture provision which gives
the seller the power to disaffirm the contract and extinguish the
buyer's rights and interests.' 7' No restitution of the buyer's pay-
ments is granted; no further opportunity to redeem is provided.
Reasonable value: The term "reasonable value for use and en-
joyment" is employed in place of the commonly used "liquidated
damages" or "reasonable rent" as a justification for the retention
of payments and improvements. Although reasonable rental value
has been used by the court to measure the seller's damages in cases
under Montana's antiforfeiture statute, s the court in Fontaine v.
Lyng174 held that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not
exist under the installment land contract at issue there. 175 Liqui-
dated damages are void by statute in Montana.'7 6 The use of the
California version of that statute to corroborate a policy attack on
forfeiture has proved successful there, '7  but early Montana cases
170. See generally text accompanying notes 154-61 supra.
171. It may be argued that the purchaser has adequate notice up to this point, but
notice would be required if the notice of acceleration did not specify the course of action to
be taken upon failure of the purchaser to comply with acceleration.
172. See generally text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
173. Abolishing Contracts, supra note 1, at 114 n.17.
174. 61 Mont. 590, 202 P. 1112 (1921).
175. Id. at 598, 202 P. at 1114-15.
176. MCA § 28-2-721 (1979).
177. See text accompanying notes 73-76 and 79-80 supra.
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have held immaterial the question of whether a forfeiture provision
may be void as an unenforceable liquidation of damages. 17 Given
the basis of the forfeiture provision in the American Rule,17 ' it may
be unnecessary to fix any label on the forfeiture other than the
neutral "reasonable value for use and enjoyment."
2. Exercise the power of sale as provided in this contract for the
purpose of foreclosing the buyer's interest in the property; or...
Power of sale: A power of sale provision that gives the seller
the right to sell the property to satisfy the buyer's obligation would
be included in the body of the contract. That provision would in-
clude requirements for notice and advertisement of the sale, and
might grant the buyer the right to discharge the accelerated debt
up to the date of sale. The power of sale remedy is envisioned to
operate chiefly when forfeiture is extinguished. s18 But there seems
no reason to preclude its availability to the seller before that point.
3. Pursue any and all remedies at law or equity to enforce per-
formance of this contract, or to collect the balance due hereunder.
Reasonable attorney fees incurred by such action shall be
included.
Other remedies: This provision expressly gives the seller the
option to pursue any other remedies he finds necessary. The ab-
sence of any express limitation on remedies insures the same re-
sult.189 Specific performance and an action at law for the purchase
price are included in the provision.' 8 2 The expression of the intent
to recover the balance may aid a court of equity in effecting the
intent of the parties.188
In the event that the buyer has paid 20% of the contract
price, which includes principal plus interest, the seller's right to
cancel the contract upon the buyer's default shall be extin-
guished, and the buyer shall have an additional 30 days in which
to pay the entire sum due, if the balance is accelerated as pro-
vided hereinabove.
Forfeiture: This provision provides for a limitation on forfei-
ture that should serve to make forfeiture a more effective self-help
178. Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 297, 133 P. 694, 696 (1913); Fratt
v. Daniels-Jones, 47 Mont. 487, 496, 133 P. 700, 701-02 (1913) (both cases held that if such a
provision were found to be void, the forfeiture provision would not be affected).
179. See generally text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
180. See generally text accompanying notes 146-53 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra.
182. See generally text accompanying notes 113-26 supra.
183. See generally text accompanying notes 122-23 supra.
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remedy. 184 The limitation also serves to recognize the increasing
level of the buyer's equity. The failure of the standard forfeiture
provision to do so makes forfeiture a difficult remedy to attempt to
enforce in a court of equity. 18 5 The percentage of the contract price
at which forfeiture may be extinguished may be determined by
bargaining. 86 The power of sale provision fulfills its chief function,
when forfeiture is extinguished, by providing an extrajudicial pro-
ceeding for the termination of the buyer's interest. 87 In considera-
tion of the buyer's increased equity, he is given more time in which
to secure refinancing to discharge the accelerated debt.
V. CONCLUSION
A contractual limitation on the seller's right to exercise forfei-
ture is a recognition that the interests of the parties in the prop-
erty are not static. The standard forfeiture provision fails to recog-
nize this change in the parties' interests since it is drafted to
operate in the same manner throughout the term of the contract.
Because the parties fail to limit forfeiture, courts of equity are
obliged to make adjustments to mitigate the effects of an unrea-
sonable forfeiture.
A limitation on forfeiture, imposed voluntarily, will serve to
give the protection that the buyer's equity deserves, as well as to
ensure the effectiveness of forfeiture at the outset of the contract.
A purchaser's attorney, confronted with a standard installment
land contract, is in the best position to safeguard his client from
facing the possibility that a substantial equity may be forfeited.
Through negotiation, he may be able to arrive at a forfeiture pe-
riod that reflects the amount of equity which does not justify
defense.
By including a power of sale in the contract, the seller has at
his disposal a remedy to use in place of forfeiture that is relatively
inexpensive and expedient. Therefore, self-help, the major benefit
of forfeiture, assumes another form for the seller's use, with the
result that the contract operates with a fair set of remedies which
reflects the interests of the parties.
Robert Isham
184. See generally text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
185. See generally text accompanying notes 130-31 supra.
186. See generally text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
187. See generally text accompanying notes 146-53 supra.
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